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INTRODUCTION
Captivated by a sordid tale involving graphic sexual assault charges in
the workplace, public attention recently focused on the Supreme Court’s
policy of construing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to compel
arbitration of employees’ statutory claims—even in the most gruesome of
circumstances.1 The Jamie Leigh Jones saga began in 2005 when Jones, a
Halliburton/KBR employee working in Iraq, was allegedly gang-raped and
badly beaten by multiple co-workers.2 In an alleged attempt to cover up the
brutal incident, Halliburton put Jones in a locked trailer for hours and
threatened her job security if she left to seek medical treatment.3 Jones
filed suit against Halliburton in federal court,4 but the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas enforced an arbitration clause in
Jones’s employment contract, compelling the case into arbitration5 and
1. See, e.g., James Risen, Limbo for U.S. Women Reporting Iraq Assaults, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2008, at A1 (describing Jones’s story as highly publicized and asserting that her
testimony before Congress may help spark a movement to reevaluate arbitration for claims
of violence); see also Amanda Terkel, Halliburton/KBR Goes After Rape Survivor Jamie
Leigh Jones’ Personal Integrity in Its Supreme Court Petition, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 26,
2010, 12:34 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2010/01/26/kbr-jones-appeal/ (tracking the
progress of the Jones legal drama with distaste).
2. See Jones v. Halliburton Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 339, 343 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (describing
Jones’ allegations that she was drugged and raped, resulting in serious bodily injury,
including torn pectoral muscles); see also Brian Ross, Maddy Sauer, & Justin Rood, Victim:
Gang-Rape Cover-Up by U.S., Halliburton/KBR, ABC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=3977702&page=2 (quoting Jamie Leigh Jones
recounting her story that, following the rape incident, Halliburton put her under guard and
threatened her job position if she left Iraq).
3. Jones, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
4. See id. at 344 (listing Jones’ claims of sexual harassment and hostile work
environment under Title VII, negligence, negligent undertaking, retaliation, false
imprisonment, breach of contract, fraud in the inducement to enter the employment contract,
assault, battery, and fraud in the inducement to enter the arbitration agreement).
5. See id. at 355 (compelling arbitration of Jones’s claims that fell within the scope of
the arbitration agreement in her employment contract, including claims of sexual harassment
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igniting an uproar in both Congress and the media.6
In response to the public outcry over the decision compelling arbitration
in Jones v. Halliburton Co.,7 Congress, at Senator Al Franken’s urging,
amended the Defense Department’s 2010 appropriations bill (“the Franken
Amendment”) to deny government defense contracts to companies, like
Halliburton, that require employees to sign away their rights to sue for
sexual assault.8 Citing due process concerns in precluding victims of
sexual assault from having their day in court, Senator Franken admonished
the fine print arbitration clauses that now permeate most employment
contracts.9 The Jones episode dramatically illustrated the extent to which
employees can be precluded from litigating statutory violations in court due
to the growing body of jurisprudence limiting their ability to do so.10
Despite the public outcry11 and congressional action12 that the Jones case
and hostile work environment under Title VII).
6. See, e.g., Lynn Harris, Can’t Work for Them, Can’t Sue Them, SALON (Feb. 13,
2008, 11:23 AM), http://www.salon.com/life/broadsheet/2008/02/13/kbr_arbitration
(lamenting that arbitration clause enforcement tends to put female employees like Jones in
“legal limbo”); Justin Rood, Congress to Probe Iraq Rape Allegations, ABC NEWS (Dec.
13, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=3992370&page=1 (noting that the House
Judiciary Committee decided to hold a hearing after receiving “numerous letters from
lawmakers demanding answers in the case”).
7. 625 F. Supp. 2d 339 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
8. See Dep’t of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326 § 8116 (2010).
9. See 155 CONG. REC. S10,148–49 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Al
Franken). In support of the amendment, Senator Franken remarked:
Today, defense contractors are using fine print in their contracts to deny women
such as Jamie Leigh Jones their day in court. But it is not just Jamie Leigh Jones.
This isn’t about one instance . . . . This is about many . . . who have been hired by
contractors and who have been forced to arbitrate by contractors . . . . [W]omen are
not given their day in court. Instead, they are forcing them behind the closed doors
of arbitration where the Federal Rules of Evidence don’t apply, where decisions are
binding and secret, and where decisions are issued by a private arbitrator often paid
by the company itself.
Id. at S10,148. The Franken Amendment gained some bipartisan support and passed
through the Senate. See Stephen Clark, For Franken, No More Mr. Funny Guy, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/18/franken-mr-funny-guy/
(reporting that only thirty Republican Senators voted against the Franken Amendment).
10. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–10 (2001) (compelling
arbitration where the employee signed a standard form employment application that
included a binding arbitration provision); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 26 (1991) (deciding that an employee’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) claim was subject to arbitration, absent a showing that Congress intended to
preclude an arbitration forum); see also Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2005) (requiring crewmember employees to arbitrate their negligence claims arising
from employer’s steam boiler exploding, killing six plaintiffs and injuring four); Farac v.
Permanente Med. Grp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement in an employment contract to compel arbitration of sexual harassment
claims). See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983) (articulating a liberal federal policy that favors arbitration).
11. Jon Stewart, for example, highlighted the Jones incident and showed support for the
subsequent Franken Amendment. Showing a CNN news clip characterizing the amendment
debate as Congress deciding not to “hire contractors that make their employees agree in
advance not to sue if they’re raped by co-workers,” Stewart rhetorically mused, “how is that
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sparked, the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence continues, and the Court has,
yet again, enforced a pre-dispute arbitration clause in an employment
contract.13 In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,14 the Court considered
whether a district court may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable where the parties’ agreement contains a provision that
explicitly delegates that decision to an arbitrator (frequently termed a
“delegation provision”).15 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that
where an agreement to arbitrate includes a provision establishing that the
arbitrator will determine the enforceability of the agreement, a district court
may only hear challenges that specifically target that delegation
provision.16 If, on the other hand, the party challenges the enforceability of
the agreement as a whole, that challenge may only be heard by an
arbitrator.17 To reach this conclusion, the Court largely applied the contract
doctrine of severability, which holds that arbitration agreements can be
severed from broader substantive contracts and enforced, even if terms in
the principal contract are unenforceable.18 Under the severability analysis,

a loophole that needs closing?” The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central
television broadcast Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wedoctober-14-2009/rape-nuts.
12. The Franken Amendment went into effect on February 17, 2010, broadly
prohibiting contractors from receiving government funds if they require employees to
arbitrate certain Title VII claims. See FRANKEN AMENDMENT: CLIENT ALERT (Feb. 23,
2010), http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alerts/franken-amendment/ (advising
defense contractors with arbitration agreements to reconsider trying to enforce such
agreements in light of the Franken Amendment).
13. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010) (compelling
an employee to arbitrate his racial discrimination claims against his employer). The Court’s
pro-arbitration jurisprudence is not limited to employment contexts. Recently, the Court has
shown its staunch pro-arbitration zeal in the context of class action arbitration as well. In
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court held that parties cannot be
compelled to submit to class arbitration unless they expressly contracted to do so. 130 S.
Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010). Where the arbitration clause is silent as to class actions, class
arbitration is foreclosed. Id. at 1776. The Court extended the pro-arbitration trend when it
decided another class action case in 2011, and held that the FAA preempted California state
law which declared class arbitration waivers unconscionable and unenforceable. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (precluding consumer plaintiffs
from aggregating their false advertising claims in class arbitration, even when each
individual damages claim only amounted to about thirty dollars).
14. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
15. Id. at 2775. The term “delegation provision” refers to an agreement to arbitrate
threshold issues relating to the arbitration agreement, such as whether the parties have
agreed to arbitration in the first place. Id. at 2777.
16. Id. at 2779.
17. Id.
18. The seminal case applying severability to arbitration provisions is Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Prima Paint resolved a
circuit split by establishing that arbitration clauses, as a matter of substantive federal
arbitration law, are severable from the contracts in which they are embedded. Id. at 402; see
also Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1001–02 (9th
Cir. 2010) (permitting a claim to proceed before a court where plaintiff argued that, as a
threshold matter, the arbitration clause, standing alone, was unenforceable).
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the Court compelled the plaintiff’s claim into arbitration because it targeted
the contract generally and not the delegation clause specifically.19
Although the Jones case highlighted the possibility of legislative action
correcting arbitration problems, the judicial standards by which arbitration
clauses are evaluated, as seen in Rent-A-Center, continue to typify the
central Jones problem: the contractual rigidity of arbitration
jurisprudence.20 This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s stringent
application of a severability analysis to delegation provisions in
employment arbitration agreements and argues that severability is not the
appropriate legal framework for deciding delegation provision challenges.
Rather than relying on legislative action, this Comment contends that there
is a judicially-manageable standard that would preserve employees’
statutory rights without undermining past precedent or subrogating a
national policy that favors arbitration. Specifically, this Comment suggests
that the Court could preserve both the integrity of employee statutory rights
and a pro-arbitration policy by adopting and applying a “knowing and
voluntary” standard to delegation provisions in employment arbitration
agreements. Adopting a knowing and voluntary standard would maintain
the importance of mutual assent in employment arbitration agreements and
allow courts to ensure that statutory rights claims are being resolved in the
appropriate forum.
Part I of this Comment begins with a brief discussion of the procedural
and substantive rights that are at stake when threshold questions of
arbitrability proceed before an arbitrator rather than a court. Part I then
continues with an overview of how the FAA has been applied to arbitration
agreements and how severability principles have been used in arbitration
agreements. Part II next explains that a severability analysis is an
inappropriate lens through which to view threshold questions of
arbitrability in employment arbitration agreements. Part III argues that the
Supreme Court should apply a knowing and voluntary standard to
determine whether a delegation provision is enforceable in an employment
arbitration agreement. Finally, this Comment concludes by reconsidering
the consequences of maintaining a hard-line severability approach to
delegation provisions.

19. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2780 (“Jackson’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit
confirms that he did not contest the validity of the delegation provision in particular.”).
20. See generally Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is It Fair and Voluntary?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (accusing the Court of adopting a sweeping pro-arbitration stance that exceeds the
FAA’s original intent).
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BACKGROUND

A. Arbitration Versus Litigation: What is at Stake?
When a court considers threshold questions of arbitrability, the main
issue is whether a court or an arbitrator should decide whether the claim
should be litigated or arbitrated.21 The procedural and substantive
differences between litigation and arbitration are highlighted when
deciding questions of arbitrability because, depending on the outcome, the
arbitrator may be empowered to determine the validity of the contract that
gives rise to his own arbitral authority.22 Employers tend to favor
arbitration because of its lower costs, relative speed, and customized
procedural rules.23 Rather than having generalist courts decide technical,
industry-specific claims, employers seek arbitrators to provide expertise in
the decision-making process.24 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
endorsed arbitration, explaining that it merely “trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.”25 Viewing arbitration through this lens, the
Court has interpreted the FAA as propounding a national policy that favors
arbitration.26 As a result of the Court’s arbitration endorsement, predispute mandatory arbitration clauses are now ubiquitous in employment
contracts, forcing employees to arbitrate, rather than litigate, their statutory
21. A “threshold question of arbitrability” refers to issues that contracting parties would
likely have expected a court to decide. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 83–84 (2002). Thus, the answer to a threshold question of arbitrability will determine
whether the underlying controversy will proceed before an arbitrator or a court. Id.
22. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651–52
(1986) (recognizing the arbitrability conundrum and subsequently requiring courts to decide
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate grievances at issue).
23. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)
(evaluating the pros and cons of arbitration as applied to class-action arbitration); Randall
Thomas et al., Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An Empirical and
Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 970–71 (2010) (explaining that if arbitration
does not proceed quickly and efficiently, the parties may threaten to fire the arbitrator).
24. See Thomas et al., supra note 23, at 970 (suggesting that employers may prioritize
business expertise over legal expertise).
25. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). But
see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 233, 261–62 (2008) (alleging that arbitration deprives parties of rights they would
have in court, but realizing that correcting this problem would mean sacrificing arbitration’s
procedural efficiency).
26. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628–29 (enforcing pre-dispute arbitration
agreements against small businesses asserting Sherman Act claims); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring that the FAA is a canon of federal arbitration law
that requires arbitration questions to be resolved in favor of arbitration).
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claims before disputes even arise.27 Yet, despite the Court’s frequent proarbitration gloss on the differences between arbitration and adjudication,28
several important characteristics make the two forums quite different.29
Generally, arbitration is designed to abbreviate judicial proceedings and
reduce costs.30 Commentators have suggested that arbitration agreements
often limit discovery, provide for an accelerated resolution time schedule,
alter the burden of proof,31 and restrict the availability of appeals.32 Such
agreements can even stipulate that the parties will not use counsel.33 While
these sorts of provisions may seem neutral on their face, they often tend to

27. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (finding
that a “large and rapidly growing number” of employers are requiring employees to submit
their claims to binding arbitration). Congress has not turned a blind eye to the growing use
of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contexts, where employees
and consumers typically have little or no bargaining power. The Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011 (AFA), a pending bill reintroducing the 2009 Act, would amend the FAA to make
certain pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 402 (2011).
28. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (citing
reduced costs of arbitration as a contributing factor in the pro-arbitration calculus); Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 26 (concluding that statutory claims, in light of the national pro-arbitration
policy, can be subjected to arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (construing section 2 of the FAA as a declaration of federal
policy favoring arbitration, as a matter of substantive federal law).
29. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“The loss of the proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial
rights.”); see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (noting
that the decision as to which forum has the authority to decide whether a party consented to
arbitration “can make a critical difference” in the outcome of the case); David S. Schwartz,
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1340–41 (2009)
(concluding that there is no proof that mandatory arbitration is fair); Jean R. Sternlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1673 (2005)
(concluding that mandatory arbitration is unjust not only because it usurps substantive and
procedural rights, but also because it excludes the public service component of the justice
system). But see Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It
Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 796 (2008) (arguing that arbitration actually benefits
employees by providing greater access to a forum for dispute resolution than litigation).
30. See David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563–64 (2005) (contending that
arbitration provides a quicker resolution than litigation by reducing the cost and time
involved with resolving the dispute). But see Julia A. Scarpino, Comment, Mandatory
Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A Proposal to Ease the Financial Burden on LowIncome Consumers, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 679, 681 (2002) (asserting that
plaintiffs often encounter prohibitively expensive arbitration costs).
31. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 30, at 1563–64 (delineating common critiques of
mandatory arbitration).
32. See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1282–83 (positing that the availability of appellate
access is favorable for employees because it may have a moderating influence on a decisionmaker). But see Stephen Willis Murphy, Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 895 (2010) (citing studies that indicate some
employers actually favor litigation over arbitration due to the availability of appellate
review).
33. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 33 (1998) (explaining that arbitration agreements can
stipulate that neither party will have legal representation).
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disadvantage plaintiff-employees.34
For example, limited discovery
provisions may prevent employees from accessing the incriminating
documents needed to meet the applicable burden of proof.35 Similarly,
arbitration provisions that prevent both parties from using counsel may also
favor employers since employers have access to other trained professionals
on staff who are familiar with arbitration proceedings.36
Employees can be further disadvantaged by mandatory arbitration
because of the “repeat player” problem.37 Many employment arbitration
agreements allow the employer to be involved in choosing the arbitrator.38
Consequently, an employer’s ability to influence the selection of an
arbitrator often gives rise to symbiotic relationships between employers and
arbitrators.39 Employers then become repeat players compared to the onetimer employee, benefitting from their extensive experience with
arbitration.40 Indeed, an empirical study of the repeat player problem
examined the results of employment arbitrations where employers were
repeat players and concluded that employees fared quite poorly in such
situations.41 The discrepancy between employer and employee success
rates in repeat player cases as compared with other employment arbitration
cases suggests that employees suffer from unequal bargaining power.42
Because arbitrators may have a financial interest in continued work from
repeat player employers,43 there is little incentive “to satisfy the employee,
34. Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1283 (summarizing evidence that suggests
mandatory arbitration is unfair).
35. See Beth A. Rowe, Comment, Binding Arbitration of Employment Disputes:
Opposing Pre-Dispute Agreements, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 921, 936–37 (1996) (explaining that,
without the ability to compel discovery, employees may be precluded from obtaining
necessary evidence from the more detailed records of employers).
36. See Maltby, supra note 33, at 33. But see Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for
Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–64 (2001) (arguing that employee claims generally
do not attract the interest of private lawyers because they are too small and that arbitration is
a preferable alternative for pro se plaintiffs).
37. A repeat player is an employer who frequently engages in arbitrations and thus has
experience advantages in the arbitral forum. See generally Darren P. Lindamood,
Comment, Redressing the Arbitration Process: An Alternative to the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 303 (2010) (articulating the inherent bias
problems that arise when companies that frequently engage in arbitral proceedings develop
experiential advantages).
38. See Maltby, supra note 33, at 33 (explaining that arbitration agreements may permit
employers to manipulate arbitrator selection by submitting a list of potential candidates).
39. See id.
40. See generally Sternlight, supra note 29, at 1654 (questioning whether an
inexperienced employee could successfully represent herself pro se in arbitration).
41. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 213 (1997) (examining empirical data and finding that employees
only won sixteen percent of cases against repeat players).
42. See id. (arguing that unequal bargaining power, often a product of divergent
economic status, is a likely explanation for the low employee success rate).
43. See Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded
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who is highly unlikely to have another opportunity to choose an
arbitrator.”44
Another distinction between arbitration and litigation is that arbitration
may not allow for adequate development of the law.45 Arbitration opinions
are typically unpublished and are not made available to the public.46
Generally, arbitrators are not obligated to issue written opinions, but even if
they were so obligated, their opinions would not have the same
precedential value as court-issued opinions.47 Furthermore, although a
party may petition a court to review an arbitrator’s decision, courts will
usually only set aside arbitration decisions in exceptional circumstances.48
And, as Justice Douglas stated, “[a]n arbitral award can be made without
explication of reasons and without development of a record, so that the
arbitrator’s conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely
incorrect yet functionally unreviewable, even when the arbitrator seeks to
apply [public] law.”49 In addition to reviewability problems, arbitrators
often remain immune from malpractice suits,50 and unlike judges,
arbitrators’ decisions are not available to the public. The lack of judicial
review, combined with arbitrators’ malpractice immunity, may deprive
arbitration claimants of protection from the mistakes of arbitrators.51
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 401 (2010) (noting that as arbitration has grown
increasingly more prominent, it has spawned a lucrative private business, with some judges
retiring from the bench in order to earn substantial sums as private arbitrators).
44. Maltby, supra note 33, at 33.
45. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009)
(“Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law for civil rights and
consumer rights, because there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions. . . .
Arbitrators enjoy near complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules.”); see
also Carbonneau, supra note 25, at 266 (explaining that decisional law suffers under
prevalent arbitration because legal standards are not generated for the public record or stare
decisis).
46. See Kathyrn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 807 (2009) (analogizing arbitration decisions to “secret law,”
known only to repeat players).
47. See generally Sherwyn et al., supra note 30, at 1563 (noting that private arbitration
does not entail public accountability as public litigation does).
48. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (permitting overturning only
where award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means or where the arbitrator
exceeded his powers); Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509
(2001) (per curiam) (explaining that an arbitrator’s “improvident, even silly, factfinding”
will not warrant overturning the award on review); Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine
Workers, 396 F.3d 237, 239 (3d Cir. 2005) (refusing to vacate an arbitration award unless
there is manifest disregard for the contract at issue).
49. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute
Resolution Processes: What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 963
(2002) (explaining that arbitrators enjoy “quasi-judicial immunity”).
51. See generally Carbonneau, supra note 25, at 266 (“The decisional sovereignty of
the arbitrator is sometimes close to a divine right.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise
of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1189, 1214 (2003) (highlighting the danger that arbitrators, without any liability constraint,
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Nevertheless, the Court has continued to adhere to a national policy
favoring arbitration.52
B. From Prima Paint to Rent-A-Center: Disjointed and Far-Reaching
Severability Standards
The Court initiated a long-lasting pro-arbitration stance in 1967 when it
decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.53 In
Prima Paint, the Court addressed the issue of whether a claim of fraud in
the inducement of the entire contract should be resolved by a federal court
or referred to arbitration.54 Three weeks after Prima Paint contracted to
purchase Flood & Conklin’s paint business, the parties entered into a
consulting agreement whereby Flood & Conklin would provide consulting
services to Prima Paint.55 The consulting agreement contained a broad
arbitration clause that assigned any claims relating to the agreement to
arbitration.56 After discovering that Flood & Conklin was insolvent, Prima
Paint filed suit in federal court, seeking rescission of the consulting
agreement.57 In response, Flood & Conklin moved to compel arbitration of
the dispute.58
Construing section 4 of the FAA, the Court determined that the FAA
intended to effectuate a doctrine of severability, whereby an arbitration
provision may be separated from the remainder of a contract and
enforced.59 Subsequently, the Court held that a challenge to the validity of
the contract at issue did not necessarily impair the separate agreement to
arbitrate within the same contract.60 Instead, the Court held that the merits
of the contractual dispute were for the arbitrator to decide, so long as the
claim of fraud in inducement did not go toward the validity of the
arbitration clause itself.61 In sum, the Court established that a court may
only entertain the suit if the plaintiff challenged the arbitration agreement
may serve more like dictators than neutral fact-finders).
52. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (expressing a
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982))).
53. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
54. Id. at 396–97.
55. See id. at 397 (describing the exchange of a covenant not to compete and consulting
advice for a series of payments).
56. See id. at 398 (“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
agreement, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration . . . .”).
57. See id. (alleging that Flood & Conklin fraudulently represented that the company
was solvent).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 399–400 (agreeing with the lower court’s analysis that a claim of fraud in
inducement of the contract generally is for the arbitrators and not the courts as a matter of
national substantive arbitration law).
60. Id. at 403–04.
61. Id.
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in its own right,62 while challenges to the whole contract must be
compelled to arbitration.63
Severability therefore allows a court to separate the arbitration clause
from the rest of the contract and analyze the clause’s independent
validity.64 Under a severability analysis, it does not matter that the contract
as a whole is invalid.65 Provided that nothing is illegal about the
independently viewed arbitration clause, courts must compel arbitration.66
Although Prima Paint was considered an overwhelmingly pro-arbitration
opinion, the Court was still careful to note that the decision was intended to
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as regular contracts, but not
more so.67
Following Prima Paint, courts have applied this analysis to sever and
enforce arbitration clauses contained in broader contracts.68 For instance,
in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,69 the Court applied
severability to sever and enforce an arbitration provision contained in the

62. Id.
63. See id. at 404 (construing the language of the FAA as precluding federal courts
from considering claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally).
64. See id. (rejecting plaintiff’s claim and compelling arbitration since the fraudulent
inducement claim failed to address the arbitration provision directly).
65. See Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 964–65 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
generalized misrepresentation allegations are insufficient to overcome a severable
arbitration clause). But see Rainbow Invs., Inc. v. Super 8 Motels, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1387,
1391 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (citing Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 855
(11th Cir. 1992)) (pointing out that severability does not mandate compelling arbitration
when there is substantial evidence that the underlying contract never existed).
66. Lawrence Cunningham, A Murder Contract’s Arbitration Clause, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Sept. 24, 2010, 4:35 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
2010/09/a-murder-contracts-arbitration-clause.html#more-34377. Compare Bridge Fund
Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming
the district court’s decision that arbitration was inappropriate where the plaintiff showed that
lack of mutuality and unconscionability permeated the arbitration clause itself), with Jenkins
v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that
the plaintiff’s claims of adhesion and unconscionability pertained to the contract as a whole
and therefore must be arbitrated), and Wolff v. Westwood Mgmt., LLC, 503 F. Supp. 2d
274, 283–84 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s unclean hands
implicated the arbitration provision, and accordingly compelling arbitration), aff’d, 558 F.3d
517 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
67. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)
(cautioning that courts cannot immunize an arbitration clause from judicial challenge).
68. See, e.g., Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54–56 (1st Cir. 2002)
(compelling arbitration where a mortgage agreement contained an arbitration provision and
plaintiffs asserted that the contract had been rescinded); Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky.,
LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to allow a claim for fraud in the
inducement to proceed in court unless the complaint contains a well-founded claim of fraud
in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself); Garten v. Kurth, 265 F.3d 136, 144 (2d
Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s contentions that (1) defendants are more comfortable in
arbitration and (2) arbitration will be less expensive for defendants than for plaintiffs, as
insufficient to render an isolated arbitration provision suspect within a construction
contract).
69. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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Deferred Deposit and Disclosure Agreement (“Disclosure Agreement”).70
Concluding that the plaintiffs challenged the Disclosure Agreement but not
the arbitration provisions specifically,71 the Court held that the arbitration
provisions were enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract.72 In
so holding, the Court acknowledged that the Prima Paint severability
standard permits a court to enforce arbitration provisions within broader
substantive contracts even if the principal contract is later deemed
unenforceable.73 The Court in Buckeye thus adhered to Prima Paint’s basic
talisman—challenges to the validity of contracts as a whole must be
compelled to arbitration.74
In 2010, the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of the
severability doctrine to include delegation provisions contained in standalone arbitration agreements.75 In Rent-A-Center, the Court considered
whether a district court may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable where the agreement explicitly delegates that decision to
the arbitrator.76 The plaintiff-employee, Jackson, pressed statutory claims,
alleging racial discrimination and retaliation.77 In response, defendant
Rent-A-Center moved to compel arbitration.78 Rent-A-Center argued that
the plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement that included a delegation
provision,79 delegating exclusive authority to resolve any disputes about the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator.80 In light of this
provision, Rent-A-Center asserted that the threshold question of whether
70. Id. at 449.
71. See id. at 444 (asserting that the plaintiff’s main contention was that the contract as
a whole should be invalidated by a usurious finance charge).
72. Id. at 446.
73. See id. at 448–49 (rationalizing the odd outcome as part and parcel of the national
policy favoring arbitration).
74. Id. at 444–45 (discussing the import of Prima Paint in creating federal substantive
arbitration law).
75. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (severing and
enforcing a delegation provision within a stand-alone arbitration agreement).
76. Id.
77. See Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that Jackson filed an employment discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
in Nevada District Court), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
78. Id. Rent-A-Center had, since about July 2000, required all new employees to sign a
free-standing arbitration agreement requiring arbitration of “all past, present, and future
disputes.” Id.
79. Id. The Supreme Court further delineated that a “delegation provision” can be
defined as “an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.”
Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777.
80. Jackson, 581 F.3d at 914 n.1. The delegation provision provided that:
[t]he arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not
limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.
Id. at 914 (emphasis added). This provision is termed the “delegation provision” because it
delegates questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777.

GOLDICH.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THROWING OUT THE THRESHOLD

8/10/2011 8:05 PM

1685

the arbitration agreement was valid was reserved only for an arbitrator, not
a court.81 Jackson countered that the threshold issue should be litigated
because the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.82
In its analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
focused on the idea that courts should determine unconscionability
challenges to arbitration agreements before compelling arbitration.83 The
court noted the FAA provides that arbitration agreements in writing “shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”84 Accordingly,
“generally applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress or
unconscionability may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.”85
In light of Jackson’s unconscionability contract defense, the Ninth Circuit
held that the threshold unconscionability challenge to the delegation
provision was properly before the court rather than the arbitrator.86 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that, in delegation provision cases, the
presumption that courts determine whether parties agreed to arbitrate “can
only be overcome with ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ of such intent.”87
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
concluding that because Jackson had challenged the arbitration agreement
as a whole rather than specifically targeting the delegation provision, his
unconscionability claim was reserved for the arbitrator and could not be
heard by a court.88 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied heavily
on the contract severability principles delineated in Prima Paint.89
Applying severability to the arbitration agreement in Rent-A-Center, the
Court stated that only challenges that specifically target the validity of the
delegation provision are relevant to a court’s determination of whether the
delegation provision at issue is enforceable.90 Therefore, a challenge to

81. Jackson, 581 F.3d at 914.
82. Id. (describing Jackson’s assertions of unconscionability due to provisions
specifying limited discovery and requiring arbitrator fee sharing).
83. See id. at 915 (reading section 2 of the FAA as requiring courts to determine
arbitration agreement enforceability as a threshold question).
84. Id. (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
85. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1133 n.13 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007)).
86. See Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917 (acknowledging that unconscionability claims are
preserved for the courts since unconscionability is a common contract defense and may
implicate the existence of mutual assent).
87. Id. (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995))
(suggesting that Jackson’s unconscionability claim undermines the theory that he
meaningfully assented to the arbitration agreement’s terms).
88. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).
89. Id. at 2778 (referencing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967)).
90. See id. at 2777–78 (extending severability to include delegation provisions since
“[a]n agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement .
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another provision in the arbitration agreement, or to the arbitration
agreement as a whole, does not prevent a court from enforcing the
delegation provision.91 Unless Jackson challenged the delegation provision
in particular, the Court held, the provision must be enforced, “leaving any
challenge to the validity of the [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator.”92
Under Rent-A-Center, the Court thus established that the severability
doctrine may be used to separate delegation provisions from arbitration
agreements and to independently enforce delegation provisions,
notwithstanding the validity of the overarching arbitration agreement.93
C. The FAA and Employment Contracts: A Tenuous Beginning
Although the Court mechanically applied a severability analysis to
enforce the delegation provision in Rent-A-Center, employment contracts
have not always been treated equally by courts applying the FAA.94 In
fact, despite the Court’s long-standing preference for arbitration, the FAA
has not always been held to cover employment contracts95 or statutory
claims arising in an employment context.96 The FAA provides that
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
. . and the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any
other”).
91. Id. at 2778 (noting that agreements to arbitrate are severable from the contract).
92. Id. at 2779.
93. See id. at 2779–81 (describing how Jackson’s unconscionability claim lodged a
general challenge against the contract as a whole).
94. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 130–31 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (condemning the majority’s application of the FAA to employment contracts as
a substantial departure from the Court’s prior implications). See generally Sternlight, supra
note 29, at 1637–38 (documenting that employers and employees alike used to think public
policy would prevent courts from compelling arbitration of employment discrimination
claims).
95. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (holding that an
employee has a right to proceed with a Title VII claim in court regardless of an arbitrator’s
prior decision). Indeed, most scholars seem to agree that the legislative history of the FAA
suggests that the Act was intended to cover commercial contracts, but not employment
contracts. See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (emphasizing that the bill would provide
enforcement for commercial contracts and admiralty contracts). Even Prima Paint, a
famous pro-arbitration opinion, implied that employment contracts may well be beyond the
scope of the FAA. As the Court stated, “[w]e note that categories of contracts otherwise
within the Arbitration Act but in which one of the parties characteristically has little
bargaining power are expressly excluded from the reach of the Act.” Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 n.9 (1967).
96. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (indicating that
arbitration was not well-suited to protect statutory rights Congress conferred on
individuals); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (“[Fair
Labor Standards Act] rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because
this would nullify the purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was
designed to effectuate.”); see also Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hat [Congress] wrote was a general exclusion for employment contracts within
Congress’s power to regulate.”).

GOLDICH.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THROWING OUT THE THRESHOLD

8/10/2011 8:05 PM

1687

foreign or interstate commerce.”97 Initially, courts adopted a plainmeaning interpretation of this section and maintained that the FAA simply
did not reach employment contracts.98
For example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,99 the Court
considered whether an employee’s right to trial de novo under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964100 may be foreclosed by prior submission of
his claim to arbitration.101 The Court flatly rejected the employer’s claim
that the employee was barred from filing suit in federal court because an
arbitrator had decided a parallel claim.102 Rather, the Court emphasized
that the arbitral forum was “comparatively inappropriate” for resolving
Title VII claims.103 The Alexander Court unanimously rejected the notion
“that arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes and that
Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions on
Title VII issues.”104 Because Alexander permitted an employee to bring a
discrimination claim in court, even if the claim had already failed in
arbitration, the decision was initially viewed as prohibiting courts from
forcing employees into binding arbitration.105
The Court expanded Alexander in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc.106 by recognizing that employees’ statutory rights were not
waivable.107 In Barrentine, the Court announced that “not all disputes
between an employee and his employer are suited for binding resolution”
and that “different considerations apply where the employee’s claim is
based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum

97. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
98. Compare Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991)
(requiring an employee to arbitrate his Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim
against his employer), with Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 (holding that a prior arbitral decision
does not preclude a plaintiff from filing a Title VII claim in federal court).
99. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006).
101. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 38–42 (noting that the arbitration clause was broad and
it provided that the outcome of arbitration would be binding on both parties).
102. See id. at 59–60 (requiring the trial court to hear the employee’s claim de novo,
independent of the arbitral decision).
103. See id. at 56–57 (faulting arbitration because arbitrators are bound by the
contractual intentions of the parties rather than by the requirements of statutory enactments).
104. Id. at 56–58 (highlighting several procedural inadequacies of the arbitration forum
in vindicating statutory rights, including: arbitration fact-finding is not equivalent to
judicial fact-finding; arbitrators have no obligation to give their reasons for an award; and
arbitration is not bound by the normal evidentiary rules that govern the courts).
105. See id. at 59–60 (establishing that an employee could pursue both arbitration and a
federal court cause of action); Sternlight, supra note 29, at 1638 n.31 (describing the initial
interpretation of Alexander as standing for the principle that employment discrimination
claims would not be compelled to arbitration).
106. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
107. See id. at 740–41 (asserting that allowing waiver of an employee’s Fair Labor
Standards Act rights would “nullify the purposes” of having the statutory rights in the first
place).
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substantive guarantees to individual workers.”108 The Court called into
question whether arbitrators were well suited to decide questions of public
law, given that statutory questions “must be resolved in light of volumes of
legislative history and . . . decades of legal interpretation and administrative
rulings.”109 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress intended to
give individual employees the right to bring statutory Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) claims in court.110
The presumption that the FAA did not apply to employment contracts or
statutory claims eroded following the Court’s 1991 opinion in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.111 In Gilmer, the Court resolved the issue of
whether an employee’s statutory Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) claim could be subject to mandatory arbitration.112 Since
Congress had not expressed an intention to preclude waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue, the Court determined that
Gilmer’s statutory claim could be subject to arbitration.113 The Gilmer
Court, while not overruling Alexander,114 shifted the burden to Congress to
explicitly exempt a particular statutory claim from being subject to
arbitration.115 The Court also abrogated Alexander and Barrentine’s
precedent by tempering the notion that arbitration is structurally ill-suited
to protect and enforce statutory rights.116 Although Gilmer made clear that
statutory claims could be subjected to mandatory arbitration, the Court did
not definitively resolve the simple issue of whether the FAA’s scope
included employment contracts.117
Ten years later, the Court decided that the FAA applied to employment
contracts in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.118 In Circuit City, the Court

108. Id. at 737.
109. Id. at 743.
110. See id. at 745 (predicating non-waivability of FLSA statutory rights on the arbitral
forum’s inability to adequately protect congressionally granted rights).
111. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. at 26.
114. Id. at 33–34 (distinguishing the case from Alexander).
115. See id. at 26 (“‘[H]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))); Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 817 (noting a shift in
burden of showing that statutory rights could not be arbitrated).
116. Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (describing both arbitration and litigation as being
capable of furthering “broad[] social purposes”), with Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1980) (lamenting arbitration’s failure to account for public laws
because arbitrators who are bound by the parties’ contract may issue rulings that are
antithetical to the employee’s statutory rights), and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co. 415
U.S. 36, 58 (1974) (criticizing the informal nature of arbitration as an inappropriate forum
for vindicating statutory rights).
117. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27–28.
118. 532 U.S. 105, 123–24 (2001) (enforcing arbitration of an employee’s Title VII
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considered the scope of the FAA’s exemption of “contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”119 Applying the statutory canon of
ejusdem generis,120 the Court rejected the notion that section 1 precluded
the FAA’s applicability to employment contracts of non-transportation
workers.121 The proper scope of the FAA’s exemption, the Court
concluded, only exempts the employment contracts of transportation
workers.122 Thus, Circuit City clarified that, despite potentially contrary
legislative intent,123 the FAA’s scope generally reached employment
contracts.124
Following Circuit City, scholars have noted that courts routinely enforce
boilerplate arbitration provisions in employment contracts, even when there
is evidence of unequal bargaining power.125 Despite the Circuit City
Court’s proclamation that the FAA applies to employment contracts, some
courts continue to accord special treatment to arbitration provisions in
employment contracts.126 In particular, some courts have adopted a
knowing and voluntary standard to dilute the enforceability of arbitration
provisions under the FAA.127

claim when his employment contract contained a broad arbitration clause).
119. Id. at 109 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)) (framing the issue in the case as whether
the FAA’s reach, under section 1, extended to all employment contracts).
120. Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory construction that interprets general words
followed by a list of specifics to include only items of the same nature as those enumerated
in the preceding specific words. See WILLIAM ESKERIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 261–62 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining how courts employ ejusdem
generis). For example, in a list that names “chocolate, caramel, peppermints, and other
treats,” the phrase “other treats” will not be construed to mean “sports car” or “champagne,”
but may include other types of sweets. See id. at 262 (providing examples of how ejusdem
generis works).
121. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118–19 (endeavoring to construe “engaged in . . .
commerce” consistently with the FAA’s purpose of overcoming broad judicial hostility
toward arbitration).
122. Id. at 119.
123. See id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s construction of the
exemption is clearly erroneous because when Congress passed the FAA, Congress’s
commerce power was only thought to reach employment relationships where workers were
actually engaged in interstate commerce); id. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is little
doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the Act has given it a scope far beyond the
expectations of the Congress that enacted it.”); see also id. at 119 (majority opinion)
(acknowledging that the legislative history arguments about Congress’s intent with respect
to the exemption are “not insubstantial”).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 819 (recognizing Circuit City as
sparking a movement toward arbitration provisions appearing in most employment
contracts).
126. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 383 (6th Cir.
2005) (applying a heightened standard of mutual assent to arbitration agreements in
employment contracts).
127. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term,
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 658 (2007)
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D. Toward a Knowing and Voluntary Standard
Recognizing that employees often have little choice in signing predispute arbitration agreements, some courts have imposed a heightened
standard of mutual assent to arbitration provisions by analyzing whether
employees knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitrate their statutory
claims.128 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted
such a standard in response to overreaching arbitration terms in an
employment contract in Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.129 In
that case, a group of employees filed a complaint for violations of the
FLSA against their employer, defendant Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.
(“Ryan’s”).130 Ryan’s moved to compel arbitration, relying on arbitration
agreements that each employee executed prior to the start of his or her
employment.131 The arbitration agreements were a mandatory precondition
to employment: failure to execute an arbitration agreement resulted in
Ryan’s terminating a job applicant’s application.132 Unlike a typical
arbitration agreement between an employee and an employer, the
arbitration agreements in Walker were between the employee and
Employment Dispute Services, Inc. (“EDSI”).133 Ryan’s employees
executed an agreement with EDSI agreeing to bring any employment
claims against Ryan’s to arbitration.134 In turn, Ryan’s would enter a
(“Notwithstanding the judicial trend in favor of arbitration, a species of the knowing and
voluntary test for enforceability survives in a few jurisdictions, and courts remain willing to
condemn employer behavior that is sufficiently misleading to undermine assent.”).
128. E.g., Walker, 400 F.3d at 381–82 (analyzing whether plaintiff-employees
knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to trial by signing an arbitration agreement in
rushed conditions); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (submitting employee’s waiver of right to bring claims in federal court to knowing
and voluntary analysis to ensure employer did not undermine statutory rights afforded by
Title VII due to superior bargaining power); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (construing employee Title VII claims as requiring scrutiny
under a knowing and voluntary standard before arbitration can be compelled). But see
Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a knowing
and voluntary standard as applied to arbitration agreements, finding that it may be
inconsistent with the FAA).
129. 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005). The arbitration agreements at issue in Walker
caused a flurry of litigation in different courts around the country. While the Sixth Circuit
was unique in applying a knowing and voluntary standard to the agreements, other circuits
have taken different approaches to invalidating the arbitration agreements. Compare Goins
v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc., 181 F. App’x 435, 438 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(setting aside the arbitration agreement due to lack of adequate consideration), with Penn v.
Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001) (invalidating the
arbitration agreement because it represented an illusory promise).
130. See Walker, 400 F.3d at 373 (alleging that Ryan’s failed to make overtime
payments to the plaintiffs, as required by the FLSA).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 375 (establishing that EDSI is a separate, for-profit corporation that
administers an employment dispute resolution program).
134. See id. (noting that under the arbitration agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to submit
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separate agreement with EDSI agreeing to “arbitrate and resolve any and
all employment-related disputes between the Company’s employees (and
job applicants) and the Company.”135
The court in Walker declined to compel arbitration, holding that the
arbitration agreements were unsupported by consideration136 and that the
employees did not knowingly or voluntarily waive their right to jury
trial.137 The court reasoned that Ryan’s failed to meet its burden of
showing that (1) the arbitration agreement was bargained for,138 (2) the
parties contemplated arbitrating a statutory rights issue,139 and (3) the
employees signed the arbitration agreement “knowingly” and
“voluntarily.”140 In particular, the court focused its analysis on the lack of
mutual assent evidenced in the arbitration agreements.141 Recognizing the
importance of ensuring that arbitration agreements are actually agreed
to,142 the court invalidated the arbitration agreement because Ryan’s failed
to meet its burden of showing that the plaintiffs had actually bargained over
the agreement or that the terms were within the reasonable expectation of
an ordinary person in the employment setting.143
As part of its mutual assent analysis, the Sixth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs should not be compelled to arbitrate their claims because they did
not “knowingly and voluntarily waive their constitutional right to a jury
trial.”144 Here, the court weighed five different factors as evidence that the
waiver was knowing and voluntary: (1) the plaintiff’s experience,
education, and background; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to
consider whether to sign the agreement; (3) the clarity of the agreement; (4)
all claims to EDSI for arbitration and to be bound by the EDSI administrator’s final
decision).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 381 (holding the arbitration agreements were unsupported by
consideration because the employer’s promise to consider job application was illusory and
inadequate). The Walker court made two independent holdings: first, that the agreement
was unenforceable because it failed to meet the knowing and voluntary standard, and
second, that the agreement was invalid because it lacked consideration. Id.
137. Id. at 383.
138. Id. at 384.
139. See id. (concluding that arbitration of this sort of claim was not shown to be within
reasonable expectation of an ordinary person under the signing circumstances).
140. Id. at 383.
141. See id. (“Although the question of mutual assent involves largely an objective
analysis, the parties’ intent remains relevant, in particular the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract.”).
142. See id. (noting that contracts, including arbitration agreements, “must result from a
meeting of the minds”); see also McNally Pittsburg, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural
& Ornamental Iron Workers, 812 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1987) (permitting an exception to
the general rule that a party’s signature is binding where the plaintiff did not knowingly sign
a document with an embedded arbitration clause).
143. See Walker, 400 F.3d at 384 (emphasizing that the agreements were presented in a
hurried, take-it-or-leave-it manner and that the plaintiffs were not highly educated).
144. Id. at 381.
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the consideration supporting the agreement; and (5) the totality of the
circumstances.145 The court observed that the facts in Walker militated in
favor of concluding that the plaintiff-employees did not knowingly and
voluntarily relinquish their trial rights by executing arbitration
agreements.146
First, the court noted that most of the plaintiffs did not complete high
school and were in dire financial straits.147 Second, the plaintiffs were
typically hired on the spot and given the arbitration agreement in a hurried
manner, without an opportunity to take the agreement home or to consult
an attorney.148 Third, when Ryan’s managers described the agreement,
they sometimes provided misleading information, undermining the clarity
of the agreement.149 Fourth, as the court had already concluded, the
agreement was not supported by consideration.150 Given the totality of the
circumstances, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive their right to court adjudication.151
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a knowing and voluntary
standard to determine whether individuals have waived their rights to
statutory remedies by agreeing to arbitration.152 In Prudential Insurance
Co. of America v. Lai,153 the Ninth Circuit invalidated an arbitration
agreement where the employees did not knowingly contract to forego their
statutory remedies by submitting to arbitration.154 The court expressly
declined to apply Prima Paint’s severability doctrine, distinguishing
Prudential as addressing the separate question of when an individual may
be deemed to have waived his or her statutory remedies.155 Unlike the
Sixth Circuit, which was primarily concerned with mutual assent, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a knowing and voluntary standard out of concern for

145. Id. (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003)
(en banc)).
146. Id. at 383.
147. See id. at 381 (suggesting the need for minimum wage employment indicated a lack
of real free will in the bargaining process).
148. See id. at 381–82 (noting that the plaintiffs would not be considered for
employment if they did not sign the agreements immediately).
149. See id. at 382 (stating that one manager represented the arbitration agreement as
ensuring that if problems arose, they would be handled by higher management within the
company).
150. Id. at 381 (finding that in return for their agreement to arbitrate, the plaintiffs only
received an illusory promise from the defendant).
151. Id.
152. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994)
(suggesting that arbitration is intended to supplement, not supplant, statutory remedies); cf.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (applying a “knowing and intelligent”
waiver standard in criminal cases to protect defendants’ trial rights).
153. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 1305.
155. Id. at 1303.
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congressional intent.156 After reviewing Title VII’s legislative history, the
court concluded that Congress intended to ensure that an employee’s
waiver of Title VII statutory rights through an arbitration agreement is, at a
minimum, knowingly executed.157 Although the court did not delineate the
kinds of factors a court might consider in assessing whether an arbitration
agreement had been knowingly entered into, the Prudential court did
assess: (1) the employee’s understanding of the agreement; (2) the
language of the agreement; and (3) the employee’s relative awareness of
the agreement.158 Because the employment contract failed to describe the
disputes that the parties agreed to arbitrate, the court held that the employee
did not knowingly agree to arbitrate his Title VII claims.159
Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s candid preference for arbitration,
some courts continue to recognize the unique character of employment
contracts and apply a knowing and voluntary standard for determining
whether the employee intended to waive his or her constitutional right to a
jury trial.160 Scholars have endorsed the knowing and voluntary standard as
a means of invalidating mandatory employment arbitration agreements
with unfair arbitration terms.161 Indeed, as this Comment explores,
utilizing a knowing and voluntary standard to determine the validity of
delegation provisions appropriately casts mutual assent as the key
inquiry.162

156. See id. at 1304 (studying Title VII’s text and legislative history and concluding that,
taken together, they mandated adoption of a knowing and voluntary standard).
157. See id. at 1305 (citing 137 CONG. REC. S15,472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Robert Dole)) (pointing to a statement made by Senator Dole that the arbitration
provision of Title VII allows arbitration only where parties knowingly and voluntarily agree
to it).
158. See id. (examining what the text of the form conveyed, what the employees could
have reasonably understood the form to mean, and whether the employees were aware of the
form’s nature).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234–35
(10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it
functioned as a condition of employment and failed to provide the weaker party with any
recourse from the costs of arbitration).
161. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (1997) (suggesting that a
major problem concerning arbitration agreements is that those signing and binding
themselves to the agreement fail to do so voluntarily). See generally Christina Semmer,
Note, The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard: Is the Sixth Circuit’s Test Enough to Level
the Playing Field in Mandatory Employment Arbitration?, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 607, 607
(2008) (arguing that the knowing and voluntary standard should apply to employment
arbitration agreements since agreeing to arbitrate entails waiving one’s right to a jury trial).
162. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)
(requiring a meeting of the minds as a precondition to a valid contract).
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II. PRIMA PAINT SHOULD NOT GOVERN DELEGATION PROVISION
ENFORCEABILITY ISSUES
Prima Paint provides an inappropriate analytical framework for
determining the enforceability of delegation provisions within employment
arbitration agreements. As an initial matter, severability does not apply
equally to stand-alone arbitration agreements and contracts with other
substantive terms.163 Using a severability analysis to sever delegation
provisions from contracts also fails to account for the substantive
differences between delegation and arbitration provisions.164 Additionally,
a severability analysis is inappropriate where the contract only contains
arbitration terms because such an analysis effectively deprives courts of
their authority to ensure that the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes,
violating the “equal footing” doctrine.165 Furthermore, applying Prima
Paint to delegation provisions in employment contexts ignores the Court’s
general acknowledgment that statutory rights claims may deserve special
treatment.166 This Comment will explore each of these concerns in turn.
A. Prima Paint’s Concept of Severability Does Not Necessarily Apply
Equally to Stand-Alone Arbitration Agreements
Applying severability principles to separate the delegation provision
from the rest of the arbitration agreement in Rent-A-Center is inconsistent
with, and more severe than, the Court’s more moderate holding in Prima
Paint.167 In Prima Paint, the Court applied severability only to arbitration
clauses within broader contracts.168 Prima Paint contemplated a contract
containing substantive provisions unrelated to arbitration, in addition to an
arbitration provision.169 Unlike the consulting agreement in Prima Paint,
the arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-A-Center only contained
provisions related to arbitration.170 In other words, the entirety of the

163. See Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 916 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing the applicability of a severability analysis to the case at bar because Jackson
challenged a stand-alone arbitration agreement), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
164. See supra Part I.B (delineating the differences between the two types of provisions).
165. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (“[A] gateway
dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question
of arbitrability’ for the court to decide.” (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 946 (1995))).
166. See supra Part I.C (recounting the ways in which courts have granted special status
to employees’ statutory rights claims).
167. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967) (adopting severability principles to sever arbitration provisions from broader,
substantive contracts).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 397–98 (describing the substantive provisions of the consulting
agreement, which also included a broad arbitration clause).
170. Compare id. (examining the substantive terms of the consulting agreement, which
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agreement in Rent-A-Center was a stand-alone agreement to arbitrate.171
Because the agreement to arbitrate at issue in Rent-A-Center only contained
provisions relating to arbitration procedures, the relevancy of a severability
analysis is not immediately apparent.172
The charge from the Court in Prima Paint that challengers must
specifically target the arbitration provisions of broader substantive
contracts does not necessarily apply equally to contracts that solely relate to
arbitration.173 Challenging the consulting terms in a broader consulting
contract as unconscionable, for example, does not necessarily mean that the
embedded arbitration provision is also invalid.174 An unconscionability
claim directed at a broad substantive contract might not directly implicate
an arbitration agreement contained therein because the promises to arbitrate
may be independent.175 The parties may have agreed to arbitrate disputes
arising from the contract, irrespective of whether both parties performed
their ends of the bargain.176 On the other hand, the plaintiff’s assertion in
Rent-A-Center that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because
the agreement was unconscionable targeted provisions of the same singular
promise to arbitrate.177
As applied to the stand-alone arbitration agreement, Jackson’s claim
necessarily encompassed a challenge to both the arbitration agreement and

had nothing to do with the arbitration provision), with Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010) (stating that Jackson signed a mutual agreement to arbitrate
claims as a condition of his employment).
171. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2775.
172. See id. at 2786–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court in Rent-A-Center
only dealt with an “independently executed arbitration agreement” rather than an arbitration
provision buried within a broader substantive contract); see also Bridge Fund Capital Corp.
v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that
severability need not be applied when “sever[ing] the offending provisions [leaves] almost
nothing to the arbitration clause”); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 674
(6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[S]everability of a contract is a question of law and depends on
the intent of the parties.” (quoting Toledo Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. City of Toledo, 641
N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994))).
173. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 423–24 (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
severing of individual contract provisions is only appropriate when the parties agreed that
the contract would be severable).
174. See Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (differentiating between
arbitration provision challenges and challenges to general provisions of the shareholder
agreement).
175. See id. (holding that an unconscionability claim challenges the shareholder
agreement generally and does not necessarily implicate the arbitration provision).
176. See generally K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 454 (Md. 1960)
(explaining that failure to perform an independent promise does not discharge liability for
the adversary’s subsequent failure to perform).
177. See Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2009)
(describing Jackson’s allegations that the arbitration agreement’s discovery limits, arbitrator
fees, and one-sided coverage provisions rendered agreement substantively unconscionable),
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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the delegation provision.178 Unlike Prima Paint, where the plaintiff’s fraud
claim pertained to arbitration and non-arbitration terms alike, Jackson’s
unconscionability claim only related to arbitration terms—indeed, there
were no other terms in the contract.179 As Justice Stevens rightly noted in
his dissent, “a general revocation challenge to a stand-alone arbitration
agreement is, invariably, a challenge to the ‘making’ of the [arbitration]
agreement itself.”180
But rather than applying Prima Paint to allow this kind of claim to
proceed in court, the majority expanded Prima Paint to hold that where the
specific delegation provision is not challenged, arbitration must be
compelled.181 Rent-A-Center’s holding thus undermines many courts’
understanding of Prima Paint as distinguishing between the entire
contractual bargain of the parties and the arbitration clause.182 The Rent-ACenter Court, in essence, delineated a new pleading standard that requires
complainants to mention the specific sentences of the delegation provision
to maintain an action in court.183
In a straightforward severability analysis, there should be no provisions
to sever from a stand-alone arbitration agreement, as the entirety of the
agreement pertains to the parties’ promise to arbitrate.184 Jackson’s
unconscionability claim arguably complied with Prima Paint’s mandate
that the claim challenge the “making of the agreement to arbitrate”185
because his complaint implicated the stand-alone agreement to arbitrate.186
Rent-A-Center extends the reach of the doctrine of severability by requiring
challenges not to “the making of the agreement to arbitrate,”187 but to the

178. See id. at 917 (determining that plaintiff’s unconscionability claim required the
court to decide whether the delegation provision was valid in the first place).
179. See id. at 914 (describing the contract between plaintiff and employer as simply a
“Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims”).
180. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2786 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967)).
181. See id. at 2778 (majority opinion) (explaining that severability also applies to
delegation provisions, despite substantive differences between arbitration provisions and
delegation provisions).
182. See, e.g., Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d
606, 610 (2d Cir. 1969) (ordering arbitration where the plaintiff failed to allege the
arbitration provision itself was induced by illegality or fraud, based on the notion that the
agreement to arbitrate was independent of the principal contract).
183. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779–80 (faulting the plaintiff for failing to
mention the delegation provision specifically).
184. See generally David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 4 (2010) (suggesting that an unconscionability
challenge to stand-alone arbitration agreement necessarily puts the agreement to arbitrate in
issue).
185. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04.
186. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2775 (describing the terms of the mutual
agreement to arbitrate claims).
187. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04.
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making of the delegation provision itself.188 By demanding the pleading
specificity delineated in Rent-A-Center, the Court extended the concept of
severability beyond Prima Paint’s logical confines because the Prima
Paint analysis only contemplated contracts with other substantial terms.189
B. Rent-A-Center Is an Unwarranted Extension of Prima Paint that
Undervalues the Special Character of Delegation Provisions
The Prima Paint severability standard also does not properly apply to
delegation provisions because a delegation provision is substantially
different from a simple arbitration clause. A delegation provision assigns
certain threshold questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator rather than a
court.190 The phrase “questions of arbitrability” also has been given a
rather narrow definitional scope by the Supreme Court.191 The phrase is
applicable to the narrow circumstance:
where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have
decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought
that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently,
where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of
forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to
arbitrate.192

When there is a dispute about whether the parties should be subject to an
arbitration clause at all, for example, such a challenge would constitute a
question of arbitrability.193 In contrast, an arbitration provision simply
expresses the parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from a
contractual relationship.194

188. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (indicating that plaintiff had to challenge the
actual language of the delegation provision).
189. See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text (discussing the differences in the
contracts contemplated by Prima Paint and Rent-A-Center, respectively); see also Jackson
v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 916 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing the
applicability of the principles of severability to a claim that challenges an agreement to
arbitrate), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
190. See Jackson, 581 F.3d at 914 (describing the language of the delegation provision).
191. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83–85 (2002) (declining
to allow a procedural time-limit rule question to be considered a question of arbitrability).
192. Id. at 83–84.
193. See id. at 84 (rejecting the notion that parties should be forced to arbitrate a matter
they did not intend to arbitrate).
194. Arbitration provisions can come in many different forms, but all have the basic
feature of agreeing to submit certain contemplated disputes to arbitration. A standard-form
arbitration clause, for example, may provide that:
Any dispute arising out of this Agreement or relating to the Services and
Equipment must be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration
Association. Each party will bear the cost of preparing and prosecuting its case . . .
. All claims must be arbitrated individually, and there will be no consolidation or
class treatment of any claims. This provision is subject to the United States
Arbitration Act.
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Arbitration provisions are substantially different than delegation
provisions because courts are tasked with ensuring that arbitration clauses
are separately enforceable by making a threshold inquiry about whether all
of the necessary elements of an arbitration agreement exist.195 Historically,
arbitration provisions contained within a broader substantive contract have
been treated as severable because of a judicial recognition that the
agreement to arbitrate disputes may exist as a promise that is independent
of the broader contract.196 Thus, pursuant to a severability analysis, an
alleged breach of contract will not preclude enforcement of an arbitration
clause because the decision to arbitrate is independent of the broader
contract.197
In contrast, delegation provisions, having never been severed from
contracts, are not expected to have the same “mini”-contract qualities that
characterize arbitration clauses.198 Delegation provisions, embedded within
stand-alone arbitration agreements, represent only the parties’ stipulation
that threshold questions of arbitrability should proceed before an
arbitrator.199 In this sense, delegation provisions are more like discovery
limits, arbitrator selection rules, or other terms that parties may add to
shape the procedural rules of arbitration.200 Unlike arbitration provisions,
delegation provisions are not necessarily promises independent of the
principal agreement to arbitrate: the contracting parties may not have
agreed to arbitration if some procedural devices, like the delegation
provision, were struck out.201 Under the Rent-A-Center rule, stand-alone
arbitration agreements are subject to severability, even if the parties would
not have agreed to the arbitration agreement, if some of the terms were

Alltel Corp. v. Sumner, 203 S.W.3d 77, 78–79 (Ark. 2005).
195. See id. at 79–80 (delineating five essential elements of arbitration agreements: “(1)
competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutual assent, and (5)
mutual obligation”).
196. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir.
1959) (observing that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration provisions as
independent promises so that the parties can still benefit from arbitration efficiency).
197. E.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 989–90 (2d
Cir. 1942) (reading the FAA as requiring arbitration of a breach of contract suit because an
arbitration provision is not considered a dependent promise).
198. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (characterizing
typical delegation provision issues as questions of “who has primary authority to decide
arbitrability,” not whether the provision can stand as an independent agreement).
199. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777–78 (2010)
(explaining the reach of delegation provisions).
200. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon, & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994)
(specifying that once the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement, they may
stipulate to whatever procedures they would like to govern, short of authorizing trial by a
“panel of three monkeys”).
201. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 424 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (dismissing the notion that a court can re-write an agreement by
striking some provisions while keeping others).
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missing.202 By severing and enforcing delegation provisions, Rent-ACenter impermissibly allows “the judicial effort . . . to look more like
rewriting the contract than fulfilling the intent of the parties.”203
C. Applying Severability to Delegation Provisions May Violate the Equal
Footing Doctrine and Circumvent Courts’ Gate-Keeper Function in
Arbitration
Extending the severability analysis framework to encompass delegation
provisions may contravene the Court’s general policy of putting arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts204 by elevating arbitration
agreements with boilerplate delegation provisions to a superior position of
enforceability. The Prima Paint Court rejected the notion that an
arbitration agreement could be more enforceable than other forms of
contract.205 While recognizing a pro-arbitration policy, the Prima Paint
Court also realized that arbitration agreements should not be put on a
higher playing field than ordinary contracts.206 The Court’s holding in
Rent-A-Center elevates the enforceability of stand-alone arbitration
agreements with boilerplate delegation provisions because, under Rent-ACenter, such agreements become virtually impenetrable.207 The Rent-ACenter Court conceded as much by noting that under the new severability
analysis, “the claimed basis of invalidity for the contract as a whole will be
much easier to establish than the same basis as applied only to the
severable agreement to arbitrate.”208 If a party challenges the enforceability
of an arbitration agreement as a whole, then the challenge must be heard by

202. See id. at 423–24 (lamenting severability for failing to account for the fact that
parties assent to agreements as a single whole); see also Great Earth Co. v. Simons, 288
F.3d 878, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Whether the agreement to arbitrate is entire or severable
turns on the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was executed . . . .” (quoting Nat’l
Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 333 (5th Cir. 1987))).
203. Booker v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (permitting
severance of a provision barring unenforceable punitive damages based on a finding that
severance would not unravel interlocking provisions).
204. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)
(interpreting section 2 of the FAA as giving arbitration agreements equal contractual status).
205. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 n.12 (emphasizing that “the purpose of Congress
in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so”); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581–82 (2008) (reviewing
section 2 of the FAA and remarking that its purpose is to equate arbitration agreements with
other contracts).
206. See Hall Street Assocs., LLC, 552 U.S. at 581–82 (reviewing section 2 of the FAA
and remarking that its purpose is to equate arbitration agreements with other contracts).
207. See Cunningham, supra note 66 (suggesting that, following Rent-A-Center, the only
way to get a court to determine the enforceability of an arbitration clause is to allege that no
agreement ever existed).
208. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).
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an arbitrator.209 For example, prior to the Rent-A-Center pleading standard,
a claimant could allege that limitations on discovery rendered his
arbitration agreement unenforceable on an unconscionability theory and
have a court determine whether the claim was arbitrable in the first place.210
But, applying the new pleading standard, a claimant with an
unconscionability challenge must target the delegation provision as it
stands alone—separated from the rest of the arbitration agreement.211
Consequently, an unconscionability challenge would necessarily have to
show that the delegation provision, notwithstanding other arbitration terms,
is unconscionable in and of itself to maintain the action in a court.212 The
difficulty of making such a showing may thus have the effect of elevating
arbitration agreements to a superior position of enforceability compared to
other contracts, ignoring Prima Paint’s cautionary note that arbitration
agreements and ordinary contracts should be on equal ground.213
Imposing a severability analysis elevates arbitration agreements above
ordinary contracts because plaintiffs must now tailor their claims to address
the particular sentences of the delegation provision to maintain an action in
court.214 In contrast, in ordinary contract rescission cases, plaintiffs must
seek rescission of the whole contract, not isolated provisions.215 In those
ordinary contract actions, plaintiffs are not permitted to deny “the existence

209. Id.
210. See generally Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 120–21 (2d
Cir. 2010) (entertaining an unconscionability claim by conducting an independent review of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability).
211. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778.
212. Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 66 (conducting a thought experiment
regarding a contract to commit murder to emphasize the potentially absurd results of a
severability standard).
213. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the equal footing doctrine
noted in Prima Paint); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 412–13 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that arbitration agreements
should not be more enforceable than any other kind of contract); Nancy R. Kornegay,
Comment, Prima Paint to First Options: The Supreme Court’s Procrustean Approach to the
Federal Arbitration Act and Fraud, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 335, 359 (2001) (suggesting that
Prima Paint’s progeny, as a general matter, have created an elevated class of arbitration
agreements).
214. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2787 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (specifying that the
majority rule requires claims to be directed at the particular sentences of delegation
provisions). Such specificity might not be plausible in some circumstances. See, e.g., Spahr
v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1271–73 (10th Cir. 2003) (allowing court to hear general claim
that a contract is void due to mental incapacity, because, even though a mental incapacity
claim challenges the entire agreement, the challenge cannot be applied with precision to a
specific provision).
215. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 298 (1942) (stating that
whether promises constitute a single non-severable contract or many severable provisions
must be determined by asking “‘whether the parties assented to all the promises as a single
whole, so that there would have been no bargain whatever, if any promise or set of promises
were struck out’” (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
863 (2d ed. 1936))).
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of some clauses and affirm[] the existence of others.”216 Conversely, the
pleading standard enunciated in Rent-A-Center enhances the enforceability
of arbitration agreements with delegation provisions because a delegation
provision is still enforceable, even if the rest of the underlying agreement is
not.217
In addition to raising certain arbitration agreements’ level of
enforceability, severance of delegation provisions also conflicts directly
with the plain meaning of section 3 of the FAA, which provides that “upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit . . . is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement,” the court must “stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had.”218 Thus, Rent-A-Center’s
severance of the delegation provision deprives courts of their critical gatekeeping function of ensuring that arbitration clauses are enforceable and
valid.219 Instead, Rent-A-Center assigns that task to an arbitrator.220
Applying severability principles to questions of delegation provision
enforceability nullifies the court’s authority to first ensure that there is a
valid arbitration agreement.221 The FAA specifically mandates that “[t]he
court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,
the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration.”222 But in Rent-A-Center, the Court applied severability to
compel arbitration on the threshold question of whether the arbitration
agreement, in its entirety, was unconscionable because the agreement had a
standard delegation provision.223 The Court, as Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent, had to resolve the unconscionability claim “to decide whether the

216. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 423–24 (Black, J., dissenting) (ridiculing the idea that a
court could hold Prima Paint’s agreement to provide consulting services in exchange for
Flood & Conklin not to compete as severable, because, without both components, no
agreement would have been made).
217. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2780 (describing challenges that will be heard by
courts as compared to challenges that must be heard by an arbitrator).
218. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
219. E.g., Moseley v. Elec. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 171 (1963) (allowing
a claim of fraud in procurement of an arbitration agreement to proceed in district court so
court could ensure that a valid arbitration agreement existed); see also Mark Weidemaier,
Rent-A-Center Roundtable Continues, CONTRACTS PROFESSOR’S BLOG (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2010/04/rentacenter-roundtablecontinues-mark-weidemaier.html (arguing courts, rather than arbitrators, should determine
threshold challenges to clauses that provide for high initial filing fees, arbitration in remote
locations, or arbitration before a biased arbitrator).
220. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778 (requiring gateway question of whether a
claim must be arbitrated to be decided by an arbitrator if the arbitration agreement contains
a delegation provision).
221. See generally id. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that section 2 of the
FAA requires judicial review of whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement).
222. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
223. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2774.
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parties have a valid arbitration agreement under § 2” before the case can be
compelled to go to arbitration.224 Instead, the Court in Rent-A-Center
circumvented the FAA’s prescription of judicial responsibility by using
severability to mechanically carve up arbitration agreements without regard
to a preliminary determination that the “making of the agreement” is not at
issue.225
In practical effect, the Rent-A-Center Court permits the arbitrator to
determine the very validity of the arbitration agreement that allegedly gives
rise to his arbitral authority.226 In other words, Rent-A-Center permits
arbitrators to police their own authority by giving them the power to decide
whether claims should be submitted to arbitration.227 This application of
severability in Rent-A-Center is problematic because, in essence, it allows
courts to shirk their FAA-mandated duty to consider whether arbitration
provisions are valid and enforceable under state-law contract principles.228
Where an arbitration agreement is executed as a precondition to
employment, it is critical that a court first determine that the making of the
contract is not at issue, because employees are often unaware of the
implications of such terms.229
Permitting severance of delegation
provisions from arbitration agreements that are otherwise unenforceable is
a problematic extension of Prima Paint because, in the employment
context, employees often would expect a court to decide certain gateway
matters about arbitration.230 Allowing courts to sever and enforce
224. Id. at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. See id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (directing courts to ensure that the making of an
agreement to arbitrate is not at issue before allowing the dispute to proceed before an
arbitrator).
226. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (delegating all challenges to the validity of
the agreement as a whole to the arbitrator).
227. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (“The only advantage of submitting the issue of fraud to arbitration is
for the arbitrators. Their compensation corresponds to the volume of arbitration they
perform.”).
228. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“[A]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.”); see also Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Congress
also plainly said that whether a contract containing an arbitration clause can be rescinded on
the ground of fraud is to be decided by the courts and not by the arbitrators.”).
229. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (realizing that
the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers is often lost on
the parties); see also Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2009)
(determining that arbitration challengers were entitled to a court ruling regarding the
threshold matter of whether an arbitration remedy is illusory).
230. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 374 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiffs knew what they were agreeing
to); see also Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 807 (suggesting that employees often
unknowingly bargain away their rights to trial); Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving
Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the
Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1225–26 (2002) (reviewing an
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delegation provisions therefore conflicts with the Court’s long-standing
policy of ensuring that parties are only compelled to arbitrate claims that
they reasonably contemplated and agreed to arbitrate.231 Thus, rather than
simply applying Prima Paint to the Rent-A-Center problem, the Court
added a new layer of severability doctrine to the federal substantive law
associated with the FAA: now, arbitrators, rather than courts, may
determine threshold questions of arbitrability.232 In this sense, the FAA’s
reservation of revocation issues for courts is rendered meaningless.233
D. Prima Paint Cannot Apply to Statutory Rights Cases Without
Undermining the Court’s Past Precedent
Applying severability to delegation provisions where statutory rights are
at issue ignores both the Court’s past jurisprudence234 and congressional
intent.235 Specifically, applying Prima Paint to enforce delegation
provisions in arbitration agreements fails to account for prior jurisprudence
and legislative history suggesting that statutory claims deserve special
treatment.236 Courts have sometimes recognized that the waivability of an
empirical study that showed employees are often uninformed about their legal rights and
remedies in the workplace).
231. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (providing that,
despite the Court’s preference for arbitration agreements, “the ‘question of arbitrability’ is
‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise’” (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986))).
232. Compare Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010)
(delegating all challenges to the validity of the agreement as a whole to the arbitrator), with
AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 651 (holding that a court, not an arbitrator, must first decide
whether an agreement conveyed an intention to arbitrate layoff grievances). But cf. Prima
Paint, 388 U.S. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[Arbitrators’] compensation corresponds to
the volume of arbitration they perform. . . . If they determine that a contract is void because
of fraud, there is nothing further for them to arbitrate. I think it raises serious questions of
due process to submit to an arbitrator an issue which will determine his compensation.”).
233. But cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 534 U.S. 157, 158 (2004)
(asserting that courts must give effect to every term in a statute).
234. E.g., Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981)
(emphasizing non-waivability of individual rights conferred by the FLSA); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (declining to compel arbitration of an
employee’s Title VII claim and articulating a cautionary belief that the arbitral forum may
not adequately protect statutory rights).
235. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (asserting
that the FAA was originally intended to apply to disputes between commercial parties of a
similar sophistication); 155 CONG. REC. S10,069 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Al Franken) (introducing an amendment seeking to remedy the unfairness of mandatory
arbitration by withholding federal funds from government contractors who require
employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements over certain statutory claims); see also
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (asserting that
remedies and procedures available to plaintiff-employees in arbitration may substantially
differ from the protections and remedies contemplated by the legislature in enacting the
statute).
236. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743 (questioning whether arbitrators possess adequate
knowledge of public law considerations to make determinations with respect to the FLSA);
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employee’s statutory rights entails more complex considerations than nonstatutory claims cases.237 Statutory rights as diverse as those contained in
Title VII, the FLSA, and the ADEA are all analogous when considered in
the context of arbitration because the rights they confer upon employees are
public rights that were carefully preserved by Congress.238 The existence
of a legislatively-created private right of action in such statutory claims
cases presumes judicial enforcement.239
While Prima Paint only required the Court to construe the FAA,240
employee statutory claims typically require an analysis of both the FAA
and the statute conferring the rights at issue.241 For example, to resolve the
plaintiff’s Title VII claim in Alexander, the Court, examining the
arbitrability of the Title VII claim, had to analyze both the substantive
provisions of Title VII and the FAA.242 Similarly, Jackson’s racial
discrimination claim would implicate both the FAA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and, as the Alexander Court determined, while arbitrators may have
specialized knowledge of the “law of the shop,” they often do not have
equivalent knowledge of the “law of the land.”243 Submitting employees’
statutory rights to arbitration without a court first determining that the
parties intended to arbitrate unnecessarily contravenes Alexander’s basic
principle that public rights should not be decided in private arbitration.244
Strictly applying Prima Paint to delegation provisions where enforcement
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57 (describing how disputes over statutory and constitutional rights
require reference to public law concepts and therefore fall under the court’s jurisdiction).
But see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985)
(announcing that an arbitration clause is no different from a forum-selection clause).
237. See generally Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305 (concluding that some of the procedural
protections of arbitration may not be adequate with respect to Title VII sexual harassment
claims).
238. See Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 803–04, 807 (equating various statutory
rights and suggesting their commonality in being federally created remedies). See generally
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 37
(1997) (insisting that permitting enforcement of adhesive arbitration clauses in statutory
claims cases effectively permits employers to deregulate themselves).
239. See Schwartz, supra note 238, at 87 (arguing that the FAA was not intended to
prevent state courts from enforcing statutory rights).
240. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 399–400 (1967)
(presenting the underlying issue not as a matter of substantive statutory rights, but as a claim
of fraud in the inducement of a contract).
241. E.g., Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2009)
(interpreting both the FAA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1999)
(analyzing Title VII and the ADEA in the context of the FAA).
242. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1974) (interpreting
Title VII in the context of the FAA’s preference for arbitration).
243. See id. at 57 (suggesting that arbitration is not the proper forum for adjudicating
statutory rights, which involve extensive knowledge of public laws).
244. See id. at 58 (“[Efficiency] makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final
resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.”).
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compels arbitration improperly subordinates these waivability concerns in
favor of a bright-line rule.245 Moreover, applying a severability analysis
obscures the rights Congress conferred on employees in enacting statutes
like the FLSA, the ADEA, and Title VII.246 Compelling arbitration of
threshold matters of arbitrability diminishes these public statutory rights
because employees are compelled to arbitrate them in a private setting.247
Furthermore, a severability analysis is inappropriate in employment
contracts because Prima Paint only contemplated a contract between two
sophisticated business actors.248 In contrast, the agreement in Rent-ACenter was between one sophisticated business actor and an employee.249
In employment situations, mandatory arbitration is sometimes considered
suspect because arbitration agreements are often the product of contracts of
adhesion and unequal bargaining power.250
Precluding threshold questions of arbitrability from adjudication in court
is problematic in an employment context where employees, like Jackson,
are often forced to sign arbitration agreements as an antecedent to
employment.251 Courts have recognized that employees may be in financial
need, making arbitration terms impossible to negotiate.252 Additionally,
employees may not even know that they are agreeing to arbitrate all
statutory claims, which creates mutual assent concerns.253 Further,
245. See Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 805–06 (equating the Court’s proarbitration stance with “Lochnerism” and arguing that the private justice trend
impermissibly excludes the legislature).
246. See id. at 834 (discussing the harmful societal impact of allowing private arbitration
to trump public law statutory remedies, including the loss of case law precedent and
development).
247. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57 (positing that statutory claims are best reserved for
the courts since constitutional and public law issues are at stake); Carbonneau, supra note
25, at 261–62 (contending that arbitration is more than a mere forum and arguing that
arbitration fails to guarantee parties the rights they would have in court).
248. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967)
(detailing the complex commercial transactions made by Flood & Conklin and Prima Paint
Corp. in interstate commerce).
249. See Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2009)
(describing the arbitration agreement between Jackson, an employee, and Rent-A-Center,
the employer, as a precondition of employment), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
250. See Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1004
(9th Cir. 2010) (treating terms over which a party has reduced bargaining power to negotiate
as procedurally unconscionable); see also Farac v. Permanente Med. Grp., 186 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (requiring a “modicum of bilaterality” before permitting
arbitration of an employee’s Title VII claim).
251. See, e.g., Jackson, 581 F.3d at 914 (noting that Jackson signed the arbitration
agreement as a condition of his employment).
252. See, e.g., Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 116 (Ill. 2006) (Kilbride,
J., dissenting) (characterizing pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provisions in employment
contexts as a product of economic coercion).
253. See id. (suggesting that employees typically do not know if they have waived
certain statutory remedies because their primary concern is obtaining employment); Reilly,
supra note 230, at 1225 (citing data from a study showing that less than ten percent of
employees tested correctly answered questions about their legal rights in the workplace).
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mandatory arbitration can be unfair for employees because it can be
expensive, limit damages, limit discovery, alter the burden of proof, allow
for untrained arbitrators, and be biased by the “repeat player” problem.254
One way that courts have combated some of the perceived unfairness of
arbitration terms in employment contexts is by using their gate-keeper role
to hear unconscionability challenges to arbitration provisions.255 But RentA-Center forecloses courts’ gate-keeping role, threatening to compound
long-standing concerns about protecting statutory rights in the arbitration
forum256 and greatly reducing the ability of employees to challenge predispute arbitration agreements.257
The Court’s strict application of a severability analysis may lead
employees to unknowingly waive their rights to fully vindicate statutory
claims.258 The Rent-A-Center Court does not offer procedures for
employees to challenge whether they intended to waive their constitutional
right to a trial, thereby undervaluing the importance of mutual assent in
creating a valid arbitration agreement.259 Under Rent-A-Center, employees
may be stripped of the important rights created and protected by federal
legislation.260 Applying a severability analysis to delegation provisions
renders these provisions virtually impenetrable, causing employees to
potentially waive their rights to a trial without even knowing it.261
See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 241 (1995) (finding that standard form contracts are often too
technical and inaccessible for laypersons to understand); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning,
and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
447, 478–79 (1999) (documenting misperceptions of the law governing the workforce
among even highly educated working professionals).
254. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 30, at 1563–64 (delineating criticism frequently
levied against employment mandatory arbitration).
255. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1420 (2008) (arguing
that as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence shut off most means of resisting arbitration, state
courts began to employ the doctrine of unconscionability to strike down arbitration
agreements).
256. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (observing that compelling arbitration can impact the choice of laws to be
applied in resolving the dispute, resulting in a loss of substantial rights); see also
Carbonneau, supra note 25, at 268 (contending that arbitration decisions involving statutory
rights should be reviewed by courts).
257. See Bruhl, supra note 255, at 1436 (explaining that under a severability analysis,
courts cannot invalidate an arbitration provision contained within a broader contract if the
unconscionability claim implicates the entire contract).
258. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 673 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (finding that the arbitration provision at issue undermined Title VII’s purposes and
remedial efforts).
259. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2784–85 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (contending that the majority should be concerned with whether the parties
intended to arbitrate arbitrability).
260. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 653 (recognizing that the goals of pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration may be “irreconcilable” with the goals of protecting statutory rights).
261. See Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 116 (Ill. 2006) (Kilbride, J.,
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III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY STANDARD TO
DETERMINE WHETHER DELEGATION PROVISIONS ARE ENFORCEABLE IN
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Rather than extending and applying Prima Paint to delegation
provisions, courts should apply a knowing and voluntary standard to
delegation provisions to assess their enforceability with special scrutiny.262
Specifically, federal courts should be allowed to evaluate whether
employees knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitrate their statutory
claims against employers by assessing: “(1) the plaintiff’s experience,
background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to
consider whether to sign the waiver . . . ; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4)
consideration for the waiver; [and] (5) the totality of the circumstances.”263
Such a standard would serve two main functions. First, a knowing and
voluntary standard would appropriately place central importance on the
parties’ mutual assent to arbitrate the issue. Second, the standard would
ensure that disputes over statutory rights are resolved in the appropriate
forum.
A. A Knowing and Voluntary Standard Properly Recasts Mutual Assent
as the Preeminent Consideration in Delegation Provision Enforceability
Unlike a severability analysis, which rigidly carves up the terms of a
contract without regard to the meaning of the agreement as a whole,264 a
knowing and voluntary standard places central importance on mutual
Adopting such a standard would realign the Court’s
assent.265
jurisprudence with the long-accepted principle that “arbitration is a matter
of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed to so submit.”266 Employing a knowing
dissenting) (suggesting that most employees lack sufficient knowledge to make informed
decisions about mandatory arbitration agreements).
262. E.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir.
2005). While imposing a knowing and voluntary standard of scrutiny on delegation
provisions may be criticized as simply permitting all unconscionability claims into court, in
the context of federal statutory rights such a result may be preferable and more consistent
with the original intent of the FAA. See generally Schwartz, supra note 238, at 76–77
(suggesting that the legislative history of the FAA makes clear that it was not intended to
cover either adhesive contracts generally or employment contracts in particular).
263. Walker, 400 F.3d at 381.
264. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 423–24 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (lamenting severability for splicing a contract into tidbits without
concern for the possibility that “‘there would have been no bargain whatever, if any promise
or set of promises were struck out’” (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315
U.S. 289, 298 (1942))).
265. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (expressing
concern about forcing unwilling parties to arbitrate issues that they reasonably thought a
judge would decide).
266. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 82 (2002) (quoting United
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and voluntary standard would also comport with the Supreme Court’s
precedent establishing that questions of arbitrability are “undeniably . . .
issue[s] for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise.”267 In particular, applying a knowing and
voluntary standard would ensure that parties clearly and unmistakably268
demonstrate that they contemplated arbitrating these issues by accounting
for the employee’s experience, background, education, and the amount of
time given to contemplate the agreement.269 Employees are often presented
with arbitration agreements as a precondition of employment.270 In such
situations, even objective manifestations of assent may not ensure that an
actual “meeting of the minds” took place because inequality of bargaining
power, together with unreasonable terms, may show that the weaker party
(in these cases, the employee) had no practical choice.271 Using a knowing
and voluntary standard to carefully scrutinize delegation provisions would
ensure that the parties are required to arbitrate only those issues that they
agreed to arbitrate.272
While courts generally apply an objective analysis in determining
questions of mutual assent, some courts have noted that the parties’
subjective intent and the circumstances surrounding the execution of an
arbitration agreement remain relevant.273 Adopting a knowing and
voluntary standard would properly recast mutual assent as a key factor in
determining whether a delegation provision is enforceable.274 Although an
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); see also First
Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (stating that arbitration is a way to resolve only those disputes that
the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration).
267. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)
(commanding the district court to first interpret the arbitration agreement to determine
whether the parties intended to arbitrate layoff grievances).
268. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 942 (assuring that parties who did not agree to
arbitrate arbitrability would have the right to court adjudication).
269. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381–82 (6th Cir.
2005) (applying knowing and voluntary factors to plaintiff-employees and suggesting that
the hurried conditions under which the arbitration agreements were presented to them
undermined the argument that the agreements were supported by true mutual assent).
270. E.g., id. (terminating application unless agreement is signed); see also Rent-ACenter, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2772–73 (2010) (explaining that the company
required all employees to sign the agreement).
271. See Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 116 (Ill. 2006) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting) (“By being economically coerced into signing a take-it-or-leave-it employermandated arbitration agreement just to maintain employment, the employee is often
unwittingly stripped of the future ability to treat issues on a case-by-case basis.”).
272. See id. at 115–16 (insinuating that failure to consider the voluntariness of the
agreement undermines public policy).
273. See, e.g., N.Y. Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Corp., 34 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.
1929) (“[I]n ascertaining what meaning to impute, the circumstances in which the words are
used is always relevant and usually indispensable.”); Higgins v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int’l, 811 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Tenn. 1991) (finding it necessary to look beyond
words themselves to determine the parties’ true intent).
274. See Walker, 400 F.3d at 383 (emphasizing the circumstances surrounding
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objective analysis of mutual assent maintains importance in assuring
contract reliability,275 in cases where an employee has no opportunity to
negotiate arbitration terms and may not understand the implications of
waiving the judicial forum,276 verifying that a true meeting of the minds
occurred is warranted.277 The best way for courts to assess mutual assent is
by applying a knowing and voluntary standard.278 Specifically, considering
the employee’s education,279 the clarity of the delegation provision, and
whether the employee had time to consider the agreement would allow the
court to verify that the employee did intend to waive their right to bring
certain claims in court.280
Adopting a knowing and voluntary standard would have the additional
benefit of restoring the courts to their original gate-keeping role.281 Rather
than applying severability to automatically refer claims to an arbitrator to
decide whether they are subject to arbitration,282 a knowing and voluntary
standard would allow a court to first be satisfied that a valid arbitration
agreement exists.283 A court would determine, as a threshold matter, that
the parties knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitrate even threshold
arbitration agreement formation as relevant to evaluating mutual assent).
275. See Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Mich. 1993) (requiring
the focus of mutual assent questions to be how a reasonable person in the position of the
promisee would have interpreted the promisor’s statements or conduct). See generally E.
ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.1 (3d ed. 1999) (“Since it is difficult for a workable
system of contract law to take account of assent unless there has been an overt expression of
it, courts have required that assent to the formation of a contract be manifested in some way,
by words or other conduct . . . .”).
276. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997)
(concluding, based on empirical studies, that workers overestimate their legal protections
and that employees often erroneously equate unfairness and unlawfulness).
277. See generally Reilly, supra note 230, at 1261 (acknowledging that informed consent
and meaningful choice are necessary to overcome barriers to consent in an employment
setting).
278. See generally id. at 1260–61 (advocating a knowing and voluntary consent model as
a means of giving job applicants a greater understanding of what rights are at stake).
279. Courts have acknowledged the distinction between laypersons without substantial
knowledge of the law and sophisticated business parties. See, e.g., Runyan v. Nat’l Cash
Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 1986) (enforcing a release waiver of the
plaintiff’s ADEA claims where the plaintiff was a highly educated, highly paid, and highly
experienced labor attorney and not a “lay person[] . . . with little knowledge of their legal
rights”).
280. See, e.g., Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a waiver was knowing and intelligent where the plaintiff was a managerial
employee and had two months to consider signing the agreement).
281. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (requiring courts to first ensure
that there is a valid arbitration agreement before compelling arbitration).
282. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010) (construing
section 4 of the FAA as requiring courts to hear challenges only where the severed
delegation provision has been specifically challenged).
283. See id. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “gateway matters” of
arbitrability should be preserved for judicial review, especially when the parties are not
likely to have contemplated the issue going to arbitration).
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matters of arbitrability, thus ensuring that the “making of the agreement for
arbitration . . . is not in issue.”284 By permitting courts to make this initial
inquiry, a knowing and voluntary standard ensures that courts retain their
gate-keeping function.285 And, instead of allowing arbitrators to decide
their own arbitral authority,286 the knowing and voluntary approach would
enable courts to first affirm that the parties actually agreed to such a setup.287 The knowing and voluntary approach is particularly appropriate in
an employment context where employees may not have negotiating power
to contest agreeing to let an arbitrator decide whether the claim will be
arbitrated.288 Thus, utilizing a knowing and voluntary standard to
determine whether questions of arbitrability should proceed before a court
or an arbitrator returns the court’s role to its proscribed FAA function:
ensuring that arbitration contracts are valid in the first instance.289
Applying a knowing and voluntary standard to delegation provisions has
the additional benefit of preserving a role for unconscionability challenges
to one-sided contracts.290 The FAA specifically mandates that arbitration
clauses are only “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”291
Unconscionability challenges are precisely the kinds of claims that the
courts should be hearing as a preliminary matter, because unconscionability
is a challenge that exists at law for revoking a contract.292 The Rent-A284. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
285. See generally Schwartz, supra note 238, at 82–83 (arguing that severability
improperly assumes that the court should not retain its gate-keeping function when a
contract is challenged generally).
286. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a
“bizarre” effect of the majority’s opinion will be that arbitrators will decide questions about
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement).
287. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)
(insisting that there must be some evidence that the employees “knew what they were
signing at the time they executed the agreements”); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (agreeing that Congress intended there to be at least
a “knowing” component to an employee’s agreement to arbitrate Title VII statutory claims).
288. See Schwartz, supra note 238, at 58 (“But if an arbitration clause has been inserted
in a contract of adhesion on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis, [as in an employment setting] it is
difficult to characterize it as the product of ‘consent,’ ‘agreement,’ or ‘bargaining.’”).
289. See, e.g., Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., 942 F. Supp. 963, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(articulating that the court must first determine the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement before compelling arbitration); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924,
937–38 (Ala. 1997) (prohibiting arbitration of contract formation issues); Frizzell Constr.
Co. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1999) (holding the same).
290. A knowing and voluntary standard also comports with the Court’s holding in First
Options that courts should not assume the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability questions
unless the evidence that they did so is clear and unmistakable. See First Options of Chi.,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (explaining why courts are hesitant to give
arbitrators the power to decide who should decide arbitrability).
291. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
292. See generally Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that unconscionability is a generally applicable defense to contracts within the
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Center arbitrability issue should have been allowed to proceed before a
court because successful unconscionability claims undermine evidence of
mutual assent.293 An unconscionability claim casts doubt on whether the
parties actually did knowingly and voluntarily delegate all threshold issues
of arbitrability to an arbitrator.294 For example, in Rent-A-Center, the
plaintiff disputed that he could have meaningfully agreed to the arbitration
agreement because the terms contained therein were substantively and
procedurally unconscionable.295 A court should be entertaining these kinds
of unconscionability claims as a threshold matter because the gravamen of
the challenge is that the parties did not meaningfully agree to the arbitration
agreement’s terms.296 The special scrutiny of the knowing and voluntary
standard would permit courts to make such preliminary inquiries before
compelling the case to arbitration by requiring courts to assess the parties’
true intent.297
B. The Knowing and Voluntary Standard Ensures Employees’ Statutory
Rights Claims Are Resolved in the Appropriate Forum
The knowing and voluntary standard should be applied in analyzing
threshold questions of arbitrability in employment contexts to ensure that
the parties fairly contemplated such issues being resolved by an
arbitrator.298 The knowing and voluntary standard, as detailed in Walker,299
allows courts to evaluate whether the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily
agreed to waive his or her constitutional right to a jury trial by assessing
factors that include the plaintiff’s experience, background, and
education.300 While it is settled law that the FAA applies to employment
meaning of section 2 of the FAA). But see AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts state law that deems certain class
arbitration waivers unconscionable because requiring class-wide arbitration “interferes”
with arbitration’s fundamental attributes).
293. See generally Bruhl, supra note 255, at 1437–38 (explaining that courts’ analyses of
unconscionability under the FAA often include a finding that the arbitration clause was
“non-mutual”).
294. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (equating unconscionability with lack of mutual assent).
295. Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S.
Ct. 2772 (2010).
296. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2784–85 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that section 2 of the FAA requires courts to hear
unconscionability challenges to ensure that a valid arbitration agreement with mutual assent
exists).
297. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005)
(announcing a five-factor test that underscores mutual assent of the parties).
298. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–44 (1995)
(emphasizing the importance of parties actually agreeing to arbitrate arbitrability).
299. See Walker, 400 F.3d at 381 (delineating a five-factor knowing and voluntary test).
300. See id. (applying the knowing and voluntary standard to assess plaintiff-employees’
financial situation and level of comprehension with respect to waiving trial rights).

GOLDICH.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1712

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/10/2011 8:05 PM

[Vol. 60:1673

contracts,301 promulgating a standard that allows courts to give special
consideration to threshold questions of arbitrability in employment
contracts may align the Court’s jurisprudence with the true legislative
intent of the FAA.302
By restoring a gate-keeping role for the courts in questions of
arbitrability, a knowing and voluntary standard would afford statutory
rights the heightened protection that Congress intended.303 Specifically, a
knowing and voluntary standard would safeguard employees who signed
arbitration agreements of adhesion from “[t]he loss of the proper judicial
forum [which] carries with it the loss of substantial rights.”304 Adopting
the knowing and voluntary standard is preferable to a severability
framework because it allows courts to account for the unique character of
employment contracts.305 In particular, the Walker standard allows courts
to consider the educational, economic, and financial background of
employees who sign arbitration agreements when determining whether an
employee knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitrate threshold questions
of arbitrability.306 The heightened scrutiny of the knowing and voluntary
standard would militate against the harshly pro-arbitration stance seen in
cases like Jones since the court would be obligated to consider the
plaintiff’s unconscionability claim before compelling arbitration.307
Certain statutory causes of action under the ADEA, the FLSA, Title VII,
and other statutes would receive the protection they deserve under a
knowing and voluntary standard because courts would at least be required
to ensure that employees were not unwittingly forced into waiving their

301. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (determining that
the scope of the FAA reaches and applies to employment contracts generally).
302. See id. at 126–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the legislative history of
the FAA plainly reveals that the Act was only intended to cover commercial contracts and
commercial disputes). Commentators have also endorsed the view that the FAA was
intended only to cover simple contract disputes between commercial entities of equal
bargaining power. See, e.g., Kornegay, supra note 213, at 345 (suggesting that legislators
only intended the FAA to include day-to-day contract performance issues that were
straightforward and factually-based).
303. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (claiming
that statutory remedies, like Title VII, can only be waived knowingly since procedural
safeguards that may be lacking in arbitration differ substantially from what the legislature
envisioned in resolving statutory claims).
304. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
305. See also Sternlight, supra note 161, at 57–58 (advocating for a four-pronged test to
determine whether statutory rights have been waived, including (1) the visibility and clarity
of the agreement, (2) the relative knowledge and economic power of the parties, (3) the
degree of voluntariness of the agreement, and (4) the substantive fairness of the agreement).
306. Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
307. See generally Jones v. Halliburton Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 339, 347–48 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (dismissing the plaintiff’s unconscionability claims but acknowledging the concern
about arbitration in the employment context).
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right to trial.308
CONCLUSION
Applying Prima Paint’s severability analysis to determine whether
questions of arbitrability should be preserved for a court or an arbitrator
creates an inappropriate framework for delegation provision analysis for
several reasons. Prima Paint provides an improper calculus for delegation
provision challenges because the concept of severability in Prima Paint
only contemplated arbitration agreements embedded in broader contracts.
The effect of Prima Paint should be confined to commercial contracts that
contain substantive terms as well as an arbitration clause. Moreover, by
applying severability in Rent-A-Center, the Court erroneously equated
delegation provisions with arbitration provisions when the two clauses are
actually substantively distinct. Further, applying severability to delegation
provisions undermines a fundamental principle of the FAA—that the court
should first ensure that the arbitration agreement is enforceable before
compelling arbitration.
Additionally, severability may even make
arbitration agreements with delegation provisions more enforceable than
ordinary contracts.
Finally, employing a severability analysis for
delegation provisions eschews the Court’s past jurisprudence, which
recognized the importance of resolving statutory claims in the appropriate
forum.
As an alternative, the Court should adopt a knowing and voluntary
standard for employment contracts. Instead of rendering most adhesive
arbitration agreements impenetrable, a knowing and voluntary standard
would ensure that employees actually intended to waive their rights to a
jury trial. Employing a knowing and voluntary analysis would allow the
courts to maintain the importance of mutual assent in arbitration contracts
by verifying that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the issue of
arbitrability. In the process, courts would regain their FAA-mandated duty
to serve as the gate-keepers of the arbitral forum. Additionally, a knowing
and voluntary standard would help reconcile the schism between
recognizing the unique circumstances of an employment contract on the
one hand and applying overly rigid contract principles that erode
employee’s statutory rights on the other.

308. See Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 837 (alleging that arbitration has become
an effective tool in voiding statutory rights).

